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I show that the “indivisible labor” models of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986), Hansen (1985), Roger-
son (1988), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and many others are, when aggregated across persons with
the same marginal utility of income, equivalent to the divisible labor model of Lucas and Rapping (1969);
any data on aggregate hours and earnings generated by the divisible (indivisible) model can be generated
by some parameterization of the indivisible (divisible) model.  The same is true when “macro” data are
obtained by aggregating over time and across people.  This equivalence means that the indivisibility of
labor per se does not have implications for macroeconomics.  Nor does indivisibility have “aggregate”
normative implications.
I then build a micro model of  the bunching of work in continuous time as the consequence of fixed costs
and “fatigue effects.”  Only in a special case does the micro model have as its reduced form the indivisi-
ble labor model.  In other cases, the bunching of work in time may have unique macro implications.  Indi-
visible and bunching models of labor are shown to have implications for public finance.
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participants at the University of Chicago.  Since this paper began as a bet with Pat Kehoe (I lost), I am obligated to
thank Pat for research assistance.  The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Table of Contents
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I.  Introduction
Employment is an important “margin” of labor supply (Coleman 1984, Heckman 1993) and
many have emphasized the micro-econometric implications of discrete choice in the labor market.
But what are the implications of “indivisible labor” for macroeconomic data - measures of economic
activity that are aggregated over time and across people?  Some (eg., Ashenfelter 1980) suggest that
the importance of the employment margin relative to the “hours” margin means that the substitution
of work over time must be unimportant.  Others such as Hansen (1985), Hansen and Sargent (1988),
Rogerson (1988), Plosser (1989), Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), Kydland and Prescott (1991),
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and Cho and Cooley (1994) have argue that the indivisibility of
labor means that there is a lot - even infinite - substitution of work over time.
One definition of “indivisibility” is common in the labor and macroeconomics literatures (eg.,
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986), Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988), Hamilton (1988), Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992)): work during some time interval must occur for exactly ￿ n units of time or
there be no work at all.  For example, the time interval might be a week with a person working
exactly forty hours during a week or not working at all.  This indivisible environment can be
contrasted with the “divisible” labor environment described by Lucas and Rapping (1969, hereafter
LR) where workers may choose to work any fraction of any time interval.
I argue that the hypothesis that all or even some workers in the economy face such an
indivisibility constraint has no implications for macroeconomics.  In particular, I write down an
economy with indivisible labor - of which Hansen’s (1985) and Rogerson's (1988) economies are
special cases - and show that any macro data generated by the divisible labor economy can be
generated by some parameterization of the indivisible economy.  Conversely, any macro data
generated by the indivisible labor economy can be generated by some parameterization of the divisible
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disutility of work assumed by Hansen (1985), Hansen and Sargent (1988), Rogerson (1988), Plosser
(1989), Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), Kydland and Prescott (1991), Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992), Cho and Cooley (1994), and others in the literature.
Although commonly used in the literature, Hansen’s and Rogerson's definition of indivisibility
is a special one.  I build a micro model of the optimal bunching of labor in continuous time and show
that a special case of the model is equivalent to my indivisible labor model.  Thus the optimal
bunching of labor in continuous time need not have macro implications.  Nevertheless, this leaves
open the possibility that some other cases of the optimal bunching model do have macro implications.
The optimal bunching of work in time has naturally led to tax rules that are functions of time
aggregated data.  I show that the indivisibility or optimal bunching of work together with time
aggregated nonlinear tax rules do have implications for both micro and macro data.  This is not a
point made by Hansen (1985) and those in the literature who have followed, but the interactions
between indivisibility and government policy may generate quite interesting implications.
II.  Macro Implications of Divisible and Indivisible Labor Supply with Linear Consumption
Value Functions
II.A.  Consumption Side of the Model
Individuals care about their lifetime consumption and its allocation over time.  My analysis
uses a “consumption value function” U(c) to summarize this part of a consumer’s decision problem:
where T ￿ 1 and eQ  is the period t interest rate factor.
-’(t-1)
t
Implicit in my use of a consumption value function in the analysis of labor supply is the
assumption that consumption and leisure are separable: a different rate of growth of consumption
(leisure) does not mean a different intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of leisure
(consumption).  I assume consumption-leisure separability not for realism, but to derive more
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I show later that, by introducing employment lotteries and some consumption insurance,
1
identical results can be derived for any increase and concave U(C).
LR’s empirical specifications implicitly assume something like separability within and
2
across periods.
typically have assumed separability.
II.B.  Lucas and Rapping’s Divisible Representative Agent Model
As a contrast to the indivisible labor model, it is useful to begin by introducing a divisible labor
environment.  During a time interval - whose length I normalize to one - an individual may work from
anywhere from 0 to n  units of time.  Time interval t work is paid at wage rate w.  The present value max                         t
of lifetime consumption C is financed out of the present value of lifetime earnings and an initial asset
stock a.
For now I assume that the consumption value function is linear: U(C) = ￿C where ￿ is a
constant.   Hence, the problem (P1) describes the representative agent's labor supply decisions when
1
labor is perfectly divisible:
(P1)  Optimal Divisible Labor in Discrete Time
where N is time worked during time period t, ’ is the rate of time preference, g is a preference t                           t
parameter, a is the consumer's initial asset holdings, w is the period t wage rate, and Q is the period t              t
t  interest rate factor (defined net of the rate of time preference).
Because of the assumed separability over time and the assumed separability of consumption
and leisure, (P1) is a special case of the LR (1969) model.   Like LR, any amount of time worked in
2
the interval [0,n ] is feasible in each time interval for a (P1) consumer. max
I make two assumptions (A1)-(A2) and one normalization (A3) about the disutility of workgtv
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(A3) is a normalization because, if ln v'(N) integrated to some number J g 0, then same
3
marginal disutility of work could be represented by redefining the parameter g as ge a n d
J
redefining  v(N) as ge v(N).
-J
(1)
v(N) defined on [0,n ]: max
3
(A1) v'(N) > 0
(A2) v''(N) > 0
(A3)
For simplicity, I assume that the function v(N) does not vary over time although the marginal disutility
of work varies over time to the extent that the parameter g varies. t
It will be useful to define a “parameterization” of (P1) to be (a,’,￿,n ,{w,g,Q}) ￿ max t t t
￿ ×￿ .  Wages and interest rates may be determined as part of a general equilibrium (as they are
23 T + 2
+
in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988)), but they are parameters from the point of view of a
consumer's decision problem.
The first order condition for the problem (P1) equates the marginal disutility of work to ￿
times the discounted wage:
In this special case that ￿ is a constant, each period’s first order condition determines optimal labor
supply for that period.
II.C.  Modeling the Micro-level Indivisibility of Labor
In the indivisible model, an individual must either work 0 or ￿ n hours during a time interval.
Any amount of work between 0 and ￿ n is not feasible.  Time interval t work is paid at wage rate w, t
so time interval t earnings are either 0 or w￿ n.  Hence, problem (P2) describes the labor supply t
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(P2)  Indivisible Labor in Discrete Time
where n is period t time worked and ￿ is a preference parameter.  My notation distinguishes n, ￿ t            t                t t
and c in problem (P2) from N , g, and C in problem (P1) because, as shown below, (P1) is assumed t   t
to describe aggregate labor supply while (P2) will be assumed to describe micro-level labor supply.
As in (P1), w is the period t wage rate and eQ  is the period t interest rate factor. t               t
- ’ ( t -1)
It will be useful to define a “parameterization” of (P2) to be (a,’,￿,￿ n,{w,g,Q}) ￿ ￿ ×￿ . tt t   +
23 T +2
Wages and interest rates may be determined as part of a general equilibrium (as they are in Hansen
(1985) and Rogerson (1988)), but they are parameters from the point of view of a consumer’s
decision problem.
(P2) describes an environment much like that of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986) or
Hansen (1985) - there are only two feasible choices for time worked during a particular period:
{0,￿ n}.  Notice that the marginal disutility of work during time interval t e ￿ can, in addition to
-’(t-1)
t
a constant rate of discount, vary over time.
It is relevant that (P2) assumes separability of leisure over time but, because of the assumed
indivisibility, not that the disutility of work is linear.  To see this, notice that we could start with any
disutility of work function v(n), normalize v(0) = 0, define v(￿ n) = ￿￿ n, and have exactly the problem tt    t      t   t
(P2).
A consumer works or not during time interval t according to:
II.D.  Aggregation of Problem (P2)
It is useful to aggregate the behavior of heterogeneous individuals solving problems (P2).ln ￿t ￿ ln gt ~ F all t
P
xd F ( x ) ￿ 0
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(2)
(3)
(A4) states the assumptions made in the aggregation:
(A4)  There are a continuum of individuals solving the problem (P2) (or the problem (P2)' defined
in Section III) who differ only according to their life cycle disutility of work profile ￿ = {￿ ,￿ ,...,￿ } 12 T
￿   ￿ .  The geometric mean preference parameter in period t, g, varies over time but the distribution +                    t
T
F of preferences around that mean is the same every period:
F is assumed to be once differentiable and strictly increasing on its support [x ,x ].  Let N denote 12     t
average labor supply during time interval t.
Notice that (A4) requires consumers to have the same market value of time w and same t
interest rate factor Q at each date as well as the same rate of time preference ’, initial wealth a, t
intrasession discount rate r, and marginal utility of wealth ￿.  These might be sources of heterogeneity
that are potentially interesting for macroeconomics, but I show that this heterogeneity is not
particularly related to the indivisibility of labor.
The fraction $ of consumers working at date t is F( ln(￿Qw/g) ).  Define N to be the date t               tt t       t
t  average labor supply.  N is computed according to: t
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where C is the average present value of lifetime consumption.  Notice the similarity of this average
budget constraint with the budget constraint for the divisible problem (P1).
II.E.  Divisible and Indivisible Models Generate the Same Macro Data
Proposition 1 When aggregated across individuals according to (A4), macro data on earnings and
hours {Nw,N} generated by any parameterization of the problem (P2) is identical to the macro data tt t
on earnings and hours {Nw,N} generated by some parameterization of the problem (P1). tt t
Proof (i)  Choose any set of parameters (a,’,￿,￿ n,{w,g,Q}) ￿ ￿ ×￿  for the problem (P2) tt t   +
23 T + 2
(ii)  When aggregated according to (A4), average hours {N} satisfy equation (2). t
(iii)  Choose the same parameters (a,’,￿,n ,{w,g,Q}) for the problem (P1) and choose any max t t t
disutility of wealth function v(N) that satisfies:
with F  defined at the end points according to F (0) = x  and F (1) = x .  Notice that any such v(N)
-1               -1      -1
1       2
is continuous and satisfies v'(N)>0, v''(N)>0, and the normalization (A3).
(iv)  According to the first order conditions of the problem (P1), average hours {N} must satisfy (1) t
which, given the definition of v'(N) above, is the same as (2).
Proposition 2 The macro data {Nw,N} generated by any parameterization of the problem (P1) is tt t
identical to the macro data {Nw,N} obtained by aggregating some parameterization of the problem tt t
(P2) across individuals according to (A4).
Proof (i)  Choose any set of parameters (a,’,￿,n ,{w,g,Q}) ￿ ￿ ×￿  for the problem (P1) max t t t    +
23 T + 2
(ii)  According to the first order conditions of the problem (P1), average hours {N} must satisfy (1). t
(iii)  Choose the same parameters (a,’,￿,￿ n,{w,g,Q}) for the problem (P2) and choose the tt tF(x) ￿
0i f x <l n v ￿ (0)
1(e x)
nmax
if x ￿ [lnv￿(0), lnv ￿(nmax)]
0i f x >l n v ￿ ( n max)
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distribution function F according to:
where 1 is the inverse of v'(N), the marginal disutility of work.  Notice that any such F(x) satisfies
F￿[0,1], F'(x)>0, and the normalization of F displayed in (A4).
(iv)  When aggregated according to (A4), average hours {N} from (P2) satisfy equation (2) which, t
given the definition of F(x) above, is the same as (1).
II.F.  Interpretation
It is noteworthy from the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 that the rate of time preference, the
marginal utility of wealth, the level of initial assets, and the sequences of wages, interest rates, and
tastes, are the same for (P1) and (P2).  Propositions 1 and 2 are the key results of this paper, but it
should be noted that a special case of Proposition 1 was stated by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson
(1988).  They showed that their indivisible labor models were equivalent to a special case of the LR
(1969) model - namely the special case when the marginal disutility of leisure is constant.  However,
their assumptions about preferences, assumptions about the homogeneity of consumers, and definition
of equilibrium makes the labor supply side of their models a special case of my problem (P2).  When
these assumptions are relaxed to allow for heterogeneity, there still exists an equivalent
parameterization of the LR model, but that equivalent parameterization need not be the linear
parameterization.  Proposition 2 shows that there is an equivalent indivisible labor model for any
parameterization of the problem (P1) - including parameterizations that are not linear and allow for
very little substitution over time.
The proofs of Propositions 1-2 obtain because the marginal utility of lifetime consumption
does not depend on any particular period's labor supply decision.  If the marginal utility of lifetime
consumption varied with the level of lifetime consumption, then the smallest possible change in any
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The approximation is likely to be poor in Rogerson's (1988) model because he has only
4
one period.
“wealth effect” in the sense that it would affect the marginal utility of wealth U' whereas my proofs
rely on the constancy of U'.  However, to the extent that ew  is a small fraction of lifetime wealth -
-r(t-1)
t
perhaps because period t is sufficiently far into the future or the length of a “period” is short - or that
U'' is small in magnitude, we can to a good approximation neglect this wealth effect and enjoy
Propositions 1-2 as good approximations.   However, rather than proving this claim I introduce trade
4
in lotteries and show that an exact equivalence obtains between the “optimal bunching,” “indivisible
labor,” and “divisible labor” economies even when the consumption value function is nonlinear.
III.  Macro Implications of Divisible and Indivisible Labor Supply with Employment Lotteries
and Nonlinear Consumption Value Functions
III.A.  Representative Agent's Divisible Labor
The problem (P1)' is a separable version of the LR model, including the nonlinear
consumption value function:
(P1)'  Optimal Divisible Labor in Discrete Time
(A5) U'(C) > 0, U''(C) ￿ 0
In addition to (A5), I continue to make the two assumptions (A1)-(A2) and the normalization (A3).
It will be useful to define a “parameterization” of (P1)' to be (a,’,n ,{w,g,Q}) ￿ ￿ ×￿ . max t t t    +
23 T +1
III.B.  Micro-level Indivisible Labor, Employment Lotteries
In the indivisible labor problem (P2), workers choose which periods to work.  Consider
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The date t lottery is: (1) an allowance 7 and (2) a probability of working % .  Consumers receive their t             t
allowance at the beginning of the period regardless of the outcome of the lottery.  The firm has
property rights over the labor output w￿ n produced by each consumer chosen by the lottery to work. t
The market for lotteries is competitive, so the only lotteries that will be traded are those satisfying:
7  =  %w￿ n t      tt
(P2)' Indivisible Labor in Discrete Time
It will be useful to define a “parameterization” of (P2)' to be (a,’,￿ n,{w,g,Q}) ￿ ￿ ×￿ . tt t   +
23 T +1
III.C.  Aggregation of Problem (P2)'
It is useful to aggregate the behavior of heterogeneous individuals solving problem (P2)'.  In
addition to (A4), I make the assumption (A6) in the aggregation:
(A6) Before their lifetime preference profiles ￿ = {￿ ,￿ ,...,￿ } are revealed at date 0, (P2)' 12 T
consumers choose an insurance contract P(￿) that has expected value zero and maximizes the
expected value of the problem (P2)'.  Ex ante, each consumer has the same probability of drawing any
particular preference profile.
There will be heterogeneity of tastes in an economy generated by aggregating (P2) or (P2)'
according to (A4).  Some consumers are “unlucky” enough to hate work in those periods when it is
most profitable, luck which affects the marginal utility of wealth U(C) in the problem (P2)'.  The
insurance contracts specified by (A4) compensate unlucky consumers (and penalize lucky consumers)
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(2)
(3)
In this model, consumer i's date t choice of employment lottery is determined according to:
Because of the date zero trade in insurance contracts, the marginal utility of wealth ￿ does not vary
across consumers and is therefore not indexed by i.  In the three cases listed above, two of them are
the “trivial” lotteries %=0 and %=1.  Nontrivial lotteries occur only when ￿ = ￿Qw which, given the t   tt
continuity of F, is a measure zero event.
It is convenient to define the date t “reservation wage” to be the lowest wage at which a
consumer is willing to work with positive probability at date t.  The date t reservation wage is ￿/￿Q tt
and work occurs with positive probability at date t whenever w exceeds the reservation wage. t
The fraction $ of consumers working at date t is F( ln(￿Qw/g) ).  Define N to be the date t               tt t       t
t  average labor supply.  N is computed according to equation (2), which I repeat below for the t
reader’s convenience:
Since the average insurance premium or award paid at date zero must be zero, an average budget
constraint can easily be computed by averaging the (P2)' budget constraint across consumers:
The average budget constraint (3), the equations (2), and the equation ￿ = U'(C) determine average
labor supply at each date.
It is worth noting that only the trivial lotteries %=0 and %=1 are demanded in the competitivev ￿(N) ￿ e F￿1(N/¯ n)
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equilibrium.  This is because of (a) the heterogeneity of consumers and (b) the date zero trade in
consumption insurance.  That the date zero trade in consumption insurance substitutes eliminates the
demand for nontrivial lotteries (%￿(0,1)) in later periods is shown by Cole and Prescott (1997).  But
even if consumption insurance were not available, the heterogeneity in tastes for work means there
would typically be only some agents who demand nontrivial lotteries.  Thus the observation that
employment lotteries are rarely (or never) used in the “real world” does not necessarily undermine
the empirical relevance of the model.
Despite their lack of equilibrium use, I include the nontrivial lotteries for two reasons.  First,
the standard analysis can be applied because choice sets are convex.  Second and more important,
Hansen's and Rogerson's models are literally special cases of my (P2)'.
III.D.  Divisible and Indivisible Models Generate the Same Macro Data
Proposition 3 When aggregated across individuals according to (A4) and (A6), macro data on
earnings and hours {Nw,N} for any parameterization of the problem (P2)' is identical to the macro tt t
data {Nw,N} generated by some parameterization of the problem (P1)'. tt t
Proof (i)  Choose any set of parameters (a,’,￿ n,{w,g,Q}) ￿ ￿ ×￿  for the problem (P2)' tt t   +
23 T +1
(ii)  When aggregated according to (A4) and (A6), average hours {N} satisfy (2) and (3), and ￿ = t
U'(C)
(iii)  Choose the same parameters (a,’,n ,{w,g,Q}) for the problem (P1)' and choose any disutility max t t t
of wealth function v(N) that satisfies:
with F  defined at the end points according to F (0) = x  and F (1) = x .  Notice that any such v(N)
-1               -1      -1
1       2
is continuous and satisfies v'(N)>0, v''(N)>0, and the normalization (A3).
(iv)  According to the first order conditions of the problem (P1)', average hours {N} must satisfy tF(x) ￿
0i f x <l n v ￿ (0)
1(e x)
nmax
if x ￿ [lnv￿(0), lnv ￿(nmax)]
0i f x >l n v ￿ ( n max)
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equation (1) with ￿ = U'(C).
(v)  By definition of the problem (P1)', average hours {N} satisfy equation (3). t
Proposition 4 The macro data {Nw,N} generated by any parameterization of the problem (P1)' is tt t
identical to the macro data {Nw,N} obtained by aggregating some parameterization of the problem tt t
(P2)' across individuals according to (A4) and (A6).
Proof (i)  Choose any set of parameters (a,’,n ,{w,g,Q}) ￿ ￿ ×￿  for the problem (P1)' max t t t    +
23 T +1
(ii)  According to the first order conditions of the problem (P1)', average hours {N} must satisfy t
equation (1) with ￿ = U'(C).
(iii)  By definition of the problem (P1)', average hours {N} satisfy equation (3). t
(iv)  Choose the same parameters (a,’,￿ n,{w,g,Q}) for the problem (P2)' and choose the distribution tt t
function F according to:
where 1 is the inverse of v'(N), the marginal disutility of work.  Notice that any such F(x) satisfies
F￿[0,1], F'(x)>0, and the normalization for F displayed in (A4).
(v)  When aggregated according to (A4) and (A6), average hours {N} from (P2)' satisfy equations t
(2), (3), and ￿ = U'(C).
III.E.  Divisible and Indivisible Models Have the Same Welfare Implications
Because there is some heterogeneity in the indivisible model but not in the divisible model,
it is only meaningful to compare aggregate welfare calculations for the two models.  Propositions 5
and 6 show there are at least two sensible ways of aggregating welfare in the indivisible model to
produce calculations identical to their divisible counterparts:˜ V
˜ V
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Proposition 5 For the problem (P2)' with rate of time preference ’, maximum hours ￿ n, interest rate
factors {Q}, and average preference profile {g} is aggregated across individuals according to (A4) t          t
and (A6), the average willingness to pay for a wage increase is the same as the willingness to pay for
problem (P1)' with rate of time preference ’, maximum hours ￿ n, interest rate factors {Q}, and t
preference profile {g}. t
Proof (i)  In current value terms, the willingness to pay for a marginal increase in w is N in the t  t
divisible model.  This follows from Roy's Identity.
(ii)  In current value terms, the willingness to pay for a marginal increase in w (taking his insurance t
premium P(￿) as given) is %￿ n for an individual in the indivisible model who purchases a date t t
employment lottery offering probability %.  This follows from Roy's Identity. t
(iii)  The average willingness to pay in the indivisible model is the average of %￿ n, which is N. t      t
(iv)  Propositions 3 and 4 show that both models generate the same average labor supply N, so the t
average willingness to pay is the same.
Notice that the wage change hypothesized by Proposition 5 is not insured and the willingness
to pay varies across individuals in the indivisible model.  Proposition 6 considers the willingness to
pay for insurable wage changes before each individual's preferences are revealed, defining “indirect
utility functions” for each model.  V(a,{w}) denotes the maximized value of the representative agent's t
problem (P1)' and  (a,{w}) the maximized value of (P2)' averaged across individuals. t
Proposition 6 When the problem (P2)' with rate of time preference ’, maximum hours ￿ n, interest
rate factors {Q}, and average preference profile {g} is aggregated across individuals according to t          t
(A4) and (A6), each individual's ex ante expected indirect utility  (a,{w}) has the same derivatives t
as the indirect utility V(a,{w}) for problem (P1)' with rate of time preference ’, maximum hours ￿ n, t
interest rate factors {Q}, and preference profile {g}. t        t
Proof (i)  It is straight-forward to show that, for the problem (P1)', 0V/0a = U'(C) and 0V/0w = t
U'(C)eQ N  .
-’(t-1)
tt
(ii)  The expected indirect utility for the problem (P2)' is:˜ V a,{wt}
T
t￿1 ￿ U a ￿ ￿
T
t￿1
e ￿’(t￿1)Qt wt Nt ￿ M
T
t￿1











˜ V ˜ V
˜ V
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(iii)  Using the expression above and the definition of N  for the problem (P2)', it is straight-forward t
to show 0 /0a = U'(C) and 0 /0w = U'(C)eQ N  . t   tt
- ’ ( t -1)
(iv)  Since N is the same function of (a,{w}) for the two models, higher order derivatives are the t           t
same for V and  .
Proposition 6 derives an equivalence between the indirect utility function for (P1)' and an
aggregate indirect utility function defined for (P2)'.  Thus Proposition 6 displays another sense in
which the aggregate willingness to pay for an aggregate wage change is the same in the two models.
III.F.  Interpretation
If we construct an economy of individuals solving the problem (P2)' with identical preferences
at each date, we have the deterministic version of Hansen's (1985) model.  To see this, notice that
a nontrivial measure of agents may demand nontrivial employment lotteries.  Furthermore, because
each agent has the same ex poste preference profile ￿, the only equilibrium date zero insurance
contract is P(￿) = 0.  In Hansen's homogeneous special case, there exists a sequence of wages and
interest rates {w,Q} so that, in Hansen's (1985, p. 318) words, “the elasticity of substitution between tt
leisure in different periods for the 'representative agent' is infinite.”  Hansen also shows that
indivisibility is not necessary to deliver this result - a linear version of LR's divisible model also implies
infinite substitutability over time (see also my Propositions 1 and 3).  However, my Propositions 2
and 4 show that indivisible labor is not sufficient to deliver infinite or even substantial substitution
over time.  This point is important and quite contrary to the spirit of Hansen's and Rogerson's papers,
so I demonstrate it in an example.
Choose any set of parameters (a,’,￿ n,{w,g,Q}) ￿ ￿ ×￿  for the problem (P2)' and tt t   +
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I owe this analogy to Bob Lucas.
5
aggregate solutions across individuals according to (A4) and (A6), taking the distribution function
F(x) = e /￿ n with support [-￿, 100 ln ￿ n].  Proposition 4 shows that the same macro data can be
x/100
 
generated by the LR model with v'(N) ￿ N .  This model has practically no scope for substitution
1/100
over time: the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1/100.
In a sense, Hansen's and Rogerson's lotteries are a source of preference heterogeneity because
they divide the population into two groups - those who work and those who do not.  But the
“heterogeneity” is not revealed until after agents have made their decisions for the period.   Hence
5
Hansen-Rogerson agents must all make the same decisions and, when those decisions are discrete,
aggregate behavior must be discrete.  Under this interpretation, my departure from Hansen and
Rogerson is that heterogeneity is revealed before decisions are made and, as a result, agents make
different decisions which are continuous in the aggregate even when discrete at the micro level.
My allowance for heterogeneous reservation wages is also of substantial empirical relevance.
Rather than describing aggregate fluctuations as infinitesimal movements along a perfectly elastic
labor supply curve (as Hansen does), I allow fluctuations to be discrete movements along an
imperfectly elastic one.  My agents almost surely strictly prefer their chosen labor force status to the
alternative.  And it takes a larger wage change to alter the decision of a person whose reservation
wage is further from the equilibrium wage.  While Hansen (1985) cannot name who will work as a
function of the equilibrium wage, I predict that the elderly, children, married mothers of young
children, and others with date t reservation wages higher than their “normal” date t market wage will
not work unless the date t market wage is substantially higher than what is “normal” for them.
Indeed, the elderly, children, and married mothers of young children typically do not work except in
extreme circumstances such as wartime (Mulligan 1998b).
As for Propositions 1-2, the proofs of Propositions 3-4 obtain because the marginal utility of
lifetime consumption does not depend on any particular period's labor supply decision.  The constancy
of ￿ is obtained in the former case by assuming a linear lifetime utility function and in the latter case
with some date zero insurance contracts and employment lotteries.  These contracts look like “paid
sick leave” or perfect disability insurance since they compensate individuals unlucky enough to dislike
work in periods when it is most productive.  If the date zero insurance were not as perfect as modeledFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor - 17
Ben-Porath (1973, p. 700) also points out that it is a quantitative question whether or not
6
the divisible model faithfully describes labor force participation decisions, but he focuses on the
serial correlation of tastes and not other relevant quantitative issues such as the quality of
insurance markets and the degree to which the marginal utility of wealth diminishes.
in the problem (P2)', then the smallest possible change in any particular period's labor supply decision
in the problems (P2) and (P2)' is a discrete change and would have a “wealth effect” in the sense that
it would affect the marginal utility of wealth U' whereas my proofs rely on the constancy of U'.
However, to the extent that ew  is a small fraction of lifetime wealth (perhaps because period t is
-r(t-1)
t
sufficiently far into the future or the length of a “period” is short), that available insurance is nearly
perfect, or that U'' is small in magnitude, we can to a good approximation neglect this wealth effect
and enjoy Propositions 3-4 as good approximations.
Notice that, in my aggregation of Problems (P2) and (P2)', I assume nothing about the serial
correlation of an individual's marginal disutility of work ￿.  It is assumed that the distribution of ￿
across persons is the same every period (up to an aggregate shifter of the geometric mean g), but this t
could result from each individual's drawing a single deviation from the population mean for his entire
lifetime, from many independent draws for each individual, or draws that are imperfectly serially
correlated over time for each individual.  The single aggregate interpretation suggested by
Propositions 1-4 of each of these possibilities means that Mincer's (1962) use of a divisible model to
interpret his empirical studies of employment rates is consistent with a more general class of life cycle
behaviors than Mincer initially supposed.  My single interpretation also seems at odds with Ben-
Porath's (1973) claim that the serial correlation of tastes is crucial and with Heckman's (1978) claims
that the “interiority” of solutions is crucial.  Formally, the difference between my result, Ben-Porath's,
and Heckman's, is that Ben-Porath and Heckman do not allow for “tastes insurance,” employment
lotteries, or a constant marginal utility of wealth ￿.  And, as discussed above,  it is a quantitative
6
question whether or not the model with tastes insurance and employment lotteries or the model with
a constant ￿ closely approximates a model without insurance, without lotteries, and a ￿ that
diminishes with lifetime wealth.  For example, more serial correlation of tastes means that more
wealth is transferred across agents by my tastes insurance and, with ￿ diminishing rapidly enough,
more heterogeneity of ￿ across agents in the model without tastes insurance.
The reader may guess that my assumed continuity and monotonicity of F and v' are notFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor - 18
necessary to obtain a macro equivalence between the divisible and indivisible economies.  v' might
be discontinuous if F' were allowed to be zero, and vice versa.  v' might be constant over some range
if F' were allowed to have mass points, and vice versa.  I leave a proof of these conjectures to the
reader.
IV.  Indivisible Labor as Optimal Bunching in Continuous Time
IV.A.  Optimal Bunching as a Dynamic Problem
For one reason or another, people choose to bunch their work and leisure together in time.
For example, workers typically work for 8 hours or so and separate the 8-hour work sessions with
16-hour intervals of “leisure” or nonwork time.  Many workers also work five days in a row and
separate these five day sessions with two day “weekends”.  Several consecutive weeks of work are
separated by three or more day “vacations” and several consecutive years of work are separated by
months or years of “unemployment,” “housework,” or “retirement”.
Is this bunching of work in time what is meant by “indivisible” labor?  If so (and Hansen
(1985) suggests this on p. 312), under what conditions do the models (P2) and (P2)' faithfully
describe that bunching?  I begin with a continuous time labor supply model with a fixed cost of
beginning a “work session” and, following Chapman (1909), “fatigue” effects on productivity or
utility.  In a special case, the model is equivalent to (P2)'.  In other cases, (P2)' does not faithfully
describe the optimal bunching of work while the model of optimal bunching may have implications
for macro data that cannot be derived from a LR model.  Hence, a look at the microfoundations of
indivisible labor does generate some macro implications which cannot be derived from a divisible
model.
Static models of fixed costs and indivisible labor have previously been developed (eg., Barzel
1973, Killingsworth 1983, Cogan 1980, 1981).  Whether or not the “fixed cost” is a time or a goods
cost matters in the static models and matters much the same way in a dynamic model.  However,
preferences, wealth, and overall labor productivity are important determinants of the degree to which
labor is “indivisible” in the static models.  This is not true in a dynamic model with employment
lotteries, where the possibilities of substitution over time or trade in lotteries effectively eliminate the
nonconvex portions of the “static budget set.”  As a result, the labor indivisibility depends only on
the magnitude of the fixed cost, whether the cost is a time or goods cost, and the way in whichFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor - 19
productivity and flows of utility depend on the history of labor supply.  The dynamic formulation also
emphasizes that the equilibrium amount of bunching of labor during one interval of time depends on
the preferences and opportunities for work at other points in time.
I derive “indivisible labor” from a tradeoff between fixed costs and fatigue effects, but others
(eg., Killingsworth 1983, Weiss 1996, Hamermesh 1997) have suggested that the synchronization of
work schedules, rather than fixed costs and fatigue effects, can result in “indivisible labor”.  I do not
explore this possibility and am unaware of a proof in the literature that synchronization is a sufficient
condition for work or leisure to be bunched in time.
IV.B.  Is One Lifetime Work Session Optimal?
Assume that, in order for work at a point in time to be productive, it must be preceded by
either work or the payment of a startup cost.  Let a “work session” be an time interval during which
only work occurs.  In a model with intertemporally separable preferences and constant growth wage
and preference profiles, a worker facing such a startup cost would have only one work session in his
life - no break-time, no weekends, no vacations, etc. - so that he would avoid multiple payments of
the startup cost.  The length of that session would depend on tastes, wage rates, etc and the timing
of that session would depend on interest rates, time preference, and the shape of the wage profile, but
there would be only one work session.  With nonmonotonic wage and preference profiles (eg., a
child-rearing period), there may be multiple work sessions but there would still be the incentive to
bunch work together in long blocks.
IV.C.  A Model of Stock Effects
To avoid this rather unrealistic implication, I also suppose that tastes or the marginal product
of labor fail to be intertemporally separable at very high frequencies.  Suppose, for example, that
workers get tired and their productivity falls after several consecutive hours of work.  Then it will still
be optimal to bunch work in order to economize on the fixed cost, but optimal work plans will
involve many relatively short work sessions.
To see the economics of this, consider a continuous time model.  As before, t indexes time
but now also takes on noninteger values.  Each integer time t is the beginning of a potential work
session.  If the session indexed by an integer t is worked, then time during interval [t,t+f] is spenty(t) ￿ Aint(t) 1 ￿ G(t mod 1) , t mod 1 ￿ Tt
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Hansen (1985) describes this setup time as “warm up time,” “driving a long distance to
7
work,” or “enduring the hassle of putting on a suit and tie” (p. 312).  It does not matter whether
there is a setup cost of working (so that f is paid at the beginning of a session) or a setup cost of
leisure (so that f is paid at the end of a session).
(4)
setting up the work session (but not producing), time in the interval [t+f,t+T] is spent working (and t
producing), and time in the interval [t+T ,t+1] is spent on leisure.  Inclusive of the startup time f, T t                      t
is work time for the time interval indexed by an integer t.
All work sessions must be immediately preceded by some startup time in the amount f.  I f
7
we interpret this model at a high frequency, f might be thought of as commuting time and a “work
session” would be a day at the office or factory.  Or f might be “Monday meetings” followed by a
four days of work.  Or, for seasonal workers, f might be “locating a job” followed by a seasonal work
session.
Work productivity y(t) at point in time t depends on the history of time use up to that point:
where int(t) denotes the largest integer less than or equal to t and (t mod 1) is (t-int(t)).  The
productivity parameter A  is a constant within work sessions, but can vary across work sessions. int(t)
Total labor product for the work session indexed by the integer t is  , where r is an
intrasession discount rate.  Notice that, since G' ￿ 0, the “margin product” y(T) falls (or at least does t
not increase) as we increase T from f to 1 while “average product” (session product per unit time) t
increases and then falls with T. t
Since G' ￿ 0, instantaneous productivity y(t) is relatively high early in the work session and
falls with time.  Hence, G can be interpreted as the “fatigue” that occurs with extended intervals of
work.  This fatigue is much like that modeled by Chapman (1909) and, without fixed costs, by
Kydland and Prescott (1983), Hotz et al (1988).  The only substantial difference is my assumption




￿’t￿(t)[1 ￿ l(t)] dt
l(t) ￿ {0,1} , ￿(t)>0
Foundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor - 21
Kydland and Prescott (1983) also assume that fatigue enters the utility function rather
8
than affecting labor productivity, an assumption which is of little consequence.
(5)
history (including work histories from prior work sessions).
8
It is relevant that f is a time cost rather than a goods cost.  I do not explicitly introduce goods
costs into the model, but similar results can be obtained by assuming a negative correlation between
f and A(t) across work sessions.  An example of a goods setup cost might be the acquisition of a
wardrobe or other equipment for the job, although a strict adherence with the model requires that the
usefulness of these items terminate when a work session terminates.
I do not explicitly model time-of-day, time-of-year, meteorological, and other naturally
recurring effects on labor productivity but the fatigue factor (4) can include these effects.  For
example, an outdoor construction worker's productivity might be low at the marginal time of day
because of poor natural lighting or low at the marginal time of year because of poor weather
conditions.  However, “naturally cycling” productivity is not enough to explain why five day work
sessions are followed by two-day weekends or why factory workers' daily work hours are more
sensitive to economic conditions than to, say, annual cycles in the times that the sun rises and sets.
Nor is it clear that the economics of labor supply under naturally cycling productivity is so different
from other stock effects that they must be analyzed separately.
The fatigue factor represented by the integral in equation (4) can also represent “progressive”
labor income taxes which are levied on time-aggregated labor income (“progressive” in the sense that
marginal tax rates rise with time-aggregated labor income).  In this case, a slightly longer work
session increases after-tax earnings by less than session average after-tax earnings because the
marginal tax rate is rising.
IV.D.  Continuous Time Preferences for Leisure
Workers/consumers get utility from leisure, but not from work or setting up a work session.
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As before, consumption and leisure are separable.  What is new in equation (5) is that leisure at any
instant in time must be either 0 or 1 ((5) does not rule out fractional amounts of leisure during a time
interval).  This rules out variation in the intensity of effort devoted to leisure or work at any instant
in time - a possibility which may itself have macro implications.
Assume that ￿(t) = ￿  so that the marginal utility of leisure is constant within work sessions. int(t)
Henceforth, subscripts are understood to index work sessions, taking only integer values t = 1, 2, 3,
...., T.
IV.E.  Lotteries and Consumption Insurance in the Bunching Model
The labor supply decision might be formulated as a choice of which sessions to work and how
long each will last.  As in the “indivisible” environment of Section II, such a formulation might
involve keeping track of the effect of each period’s labor supply decision on the marginal utility of
wealth.  As in Section II, this complication might be avoided by assuming a linear consumption value
function.  I bypass that rather straightforward analysis and instead introduce lotteries and tastes
insurance into the optimal bunching model.
Consumers choose a sequence of lotteries {L} offered by employers.  The date t lottery is: t
(1) an “allowance” 7, (2) a probability of working %, and (3) a length of a work session T. t            t                 t
Consumers receive their allowance at the beginning of the period regardless of the outcome of the
lottery.  If a consumer is chosen to work, he works for T units of time (including the fixed cost f), t
and the firm has property rights over the output which accrues according to (4).  The market for
lotteries is competitive, so the only lotteries that will be traded are those satisfying:
where r is an intrasession discount rate.
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(P3)'  Optimal Bunching in Continuous-time
There are a continuum of individuals according to their life cycle profile of tastes ￿ =
{￿,￿,...,￿ } as described by assumption (A4).  Differences in preferences across consumers can lead 12 T
to differences in the marginal utility of wealth U'(C) even if each consumer began life with the same
resources because some consumers are unlucky enough to dislike work during those periods when
it happens to be most productive.  Heterogeneity in the marginal utility of wealth is interesting but
not necessarily related to the “indivisibility” of labor so I assume that, at date zero, consumers are ex
ante identical and trade actuarially fair “tastes” insurance contracts according to (A7):
(A7)  Before their lifetime preferences ￿ = {￿ ,￿ ,...,￿ } are revealed, (P3)' consumers choose the 12 T
insurance contract P(￿) that has expected value zero and maximizes the expected value of the
problem (P3)'.  Ex ante, each consumer has the same probability of drawing any particular preference
profile.
After insurance contracts are settled, consumers choose their demand for employment lotteries
according to (P3)'.
It will be useful to define a “parameterization” of (P3)' to be (a,’,r,f,{A,g,Q}) ￿ ￿ ×￿ . tt t   +
33 T +1
IV.F.  Optimal Session Length
When the length of each session is chosen optimally, the marginal product of each session is
equated across sessions worked up to the taste parameter:Qt At[1￿G(Tt)]
e
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￿rs[1 ￿ G(s)] ds ￿ 1 ￿ G(Tmin)
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If the preference for leisure is very weak, consumers may work continuously for nearly
9
their entire lifetime.  If the preference for leisure is very strong, then consumers may choose to
work for only one session.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the T  implicitly defined by (7) is less than one.  If not,
10
min
define T  ￿ 1. min
(6)
(7)
In the case r = ’, it is easy to show that high QA/￿ sessions are worked longer, with the relationship tt t
between QA/￿ and T determined by the shape of the intrasession marginal productivity function tt t    t
G ( s ).
IV.G.  Minimum Session Length
Assuming that the utility from leisure is parameterized in a realistic way,  it is not optimal to
9
have only one lifetime work session.  A very short work session has low average productivity but high
marginal productivity.  Rather than working such short sessions, it pays to fewer longer sessions in
order to incur the fixed costs f less often.  It also pays for workers working such short sessions to
trade in lotteries so that all enjoy some earnings but only a fraction of them work and incur the fixed
cost.  Hence, the possibility of substitution over time or trade in lotteries means the “marginal
product” of any session worked should be no larger than the “average product” of the next best
session to be worked.  This implies a minimum length of a work session T , defined according to min
the equation of the average and marginal products of a session:
10G(s) ￿
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No session that is worked will be worked for less than T .  Furthermore, T  depends only min      min
on the intrasession interest rate, the fixed cost, and the shape of the intrasession marginal productivity
function G(s); T  does not depend on wages, intersession discount rates, or preferences. min
IV.H.  Equivalence of the Bunching and Indivisible Models
Propositions 7 and 8 show how the optimal bunching of labor in continuous time can be
interpreted as a discrete time indivisible labor model.  Conversely, the discrete time indivisible labor
models of Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988) and others can be interpreted as the reduced form of a
problem describing the optimal bunching of labor in continuous time in the presence of fixed costs
and fatigue effects.
Proposition 7 If G(s) takes the form (8), then for every parameterization of the problem (P2)' there
exists a parameterization of the Problem (P3)' that yields the same sequence of individual hours and
wages, where{n,w} are computed from (P3)' according to (9).  The parameters (a,’,{g,Q}) are tt                     tt
indentical for the two problems.  As functions of the parameters of (P2)', the other parameters
(r,f,{A}) for the problem (P3)' are any element of ￿×￿  satisfying (10) and r = ’. t               +
T +1




1 ￿ r ¯ n
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Under one interpretation, Kydland and Prescott (1991) also build a bunching model that
11
has Hansen (1985) as its reduced form.  They do not explicitly model “fatigue” and the bunching
of labor in continuous time, but their discontinuous utility function defined over “employment”
and “hours” can be interpreted as a bunching model where fatigue affects the disutility of work
rather than productivity.
(ii)  For any positive f, let the parameters for the problem (P3)' be (a,’,’,f,{A,g,Q}), with {A} tt t    t
computed from (10).
(iii)  When G(s) takes the form (8), we have T =   for a session t that is worked. t
(iv)  Rewriting the problem (P3)' using the transformation of variables (9), we have the problem (P2)'.
The Proposition derives Hansen's (1985) environment as a reduced form of the optimal
bunching problem when the fatigue function G(s) takes the special form (8).   Here there is no
11
fatigue early in the work session and complete fatigue later in the session.  The discrete transition
from zero to complete fatigue means that all session worked are the same length regardless of wages,
tastes, and other variables.  If G(s) declined continuously with s, then we see from equation (6) that
the length of a work session would vary with wages and other variables.
The proof of Proposition 7 reveals that there are many parameterizations of (P3)' that
generate the same data on aggregate hours and earnings as a single parameterization of (P2)'.  Indeed,
there are equivalent parameterizations of (P3)' not exhibited in Proposition 7.  An important reason
for multiple equivalent parameterizations of (P3)' is that, without any variation in hours across
sessions or across persons, it is impossible to distinguish a session with high productivity A and a high t
fixed cost f from a session with low productivity A and a low fixed cost f because both could involve t
the same hours and output.  Nor is it possible to distinguish a high intrasession discount rate from a
high marginal disutility of work because each could generate the same reservation wage.
Proposition 8 If G(s) takes the form (8), then for every parameterization of the problem (P3)' there
exists a parameterization of the Problem (P2)' that yields the same sequence of individual hours and
earnings where ￿ n and {nw } are computed from (P3)' according to (9).  The parameters k,  k
(a,’,{g,Q}) are identical for the two problems.  As functions of the parameters of (P3)', the other tt
parameters {w} for the problem (P2)' are computed according to (10). tˆ gt ￿ gt
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(11)
Proof (i)  Choose any set of parameters (a,’,r,f,{A,g,Q}) ￿ ￿ ×￿  for the problem (P3)'. tt t   +
33 T +1
(ii)  Let the parameters for the problem (P2)' be (a,’,￿ n,{w,g ˆ ,Q}), with {w} computed from (10) and tt t    t
{ g ˆ } computed from (11). t
(iii)  When G(s) takes the form (8), we have T =   for a session t that is worked. t
(iv)  Rewriting the problem (P3)' using the transformation of variables (9), we have the
parameterization of the problem (P2)' specified in (ii) above.
Propositions 7 and 8 show how the optimal bunching of labor in continuous time can be
interpreted as a discrete time indivisible labor model.  Conversely, the discrete time indivisible labor
models of Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988) and others can be interpreted as the reduced form of a
problem describing the optimal bunching of labor in continuous time in the presence of fixed costs
and fatigue effects.
V.  “Intensive Margins” in the Indivisible Model
Following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), my divisible and indivisible macro models
have been designed to generate macro data on hours and earnings.  But the models might be modified
to generate macro data on hours, employment rates, and earnings.  Are the two approaches still
observationally equivalent?  This section shows that the answer depends on the micro model of the
“extensive” and “intensive” margins.
V.A.  “Intensive” and “Extensive” Margins in the Divisible Economy
Hanoch (1980), Kydland and Prescott (1991), Cho and Cooley (1994), and others have built
both “extensive” and “intensive” margins into models of aggregate labor supply.  The marginal
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Because of the lotteries and consumption insurance, optimal lifetime consumption C
12
does not vary across individuals.
n:
(P1)''  Divisible Labor with “Intensive” and “Extensive” Margins
Notice that the wage rate is allowed to depend on the quantity of labor supplied.  The only other
difference between (P1)' and (P1)'' is that (P1)'' makes predictions for the decomposition of each
date's aggregate hours N into an employment rate $ and hours conditional on employment n.  In t        t            t
particular, optimal $ and n are time-invariant functions of N. t   t          t
As with my other divisible models, I interpret (P1)' as an aggregation across persons.  Hanoch
(1980) considers (P1)'' with T = 1 and interprets it as a time-aggregated model of individual-level
decisions.  In his interpretation, $ is the fraction of the 52 weeks in year t during which some work t
occurs and n is average hours worked during those weeks. t
V.B.  Intensive Margins in the Optimal Bunching Problem
Without assumption (8), the optimal bunching problem (P3)' is a micro model of both
extensive and intensive margins of labor supply.  Whether or not a session is worked as well as the
length of time worked conditional on working vary over time and across people.  And, since session
length varies over time and across people, so does average hourly earnings.   Let n and w denote
12
t   t
the date t session length and hourly earnings averaged across those who are working at t.$t ￿ F ln U
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(12)
(13)
As before, $ denotes the fraction working at date t. t
As in the divisible model (P1)'', the employment rate $ and average hours of those employed t
n  are time-invariant functions of aggregate hours N.  When normalized by the labor productivity t             t
parameter A, hourly earnings averaged across workers w/A are also a time invariant function w(N) t          tt              t
of aggregate hours in both models.  That function is computed below for the optimal bunching model:
Thus the optimal bunching model is a special case of the divisible model (P1)'' because the same
forces (namely the functions F and G) determining the relationship between employment $ and hours t
n also determine the relationship between hours and “wages”.  In this sense, the indivisibility of labor t
has refutable macro implications that cannot be derived from the divisible model (P1)'.
The expressions (7), (12) and (13) also show that the optimal bunching model has implications
for the relationship between fixed costs f, intrasession discount rates r, employment rates, aggregate
hours, and aggregate earnings.
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To facilitate the comparison with the time-disaggregated models, the degree of
13
indivisibility is expressed in units such that the maximum labor supply during the measurement
period is ￿ n.
Labor supply is almost always measured as a time aggregate: the total time worked during
a particular time interval such as a day, week, or year.  My Sections II and III follow the previous
literature and presume that the time interval over which labor is indivisible coincides with the interval
of time aggregation.  That is, if labor supply is measured by calendar month, then the calendar month
is the time interval during which labor supply must be either 0 or ￿ n.  By relaxing that assumption,
then the models (P2) and (P2)' can generate time-aggregated macro data that appears to have
“intensive” and “extensive” margins.
Let the “measurement period” be an aggregate of K periods (or “potential work sessions”)
in the model (P2) or (P2)'.  Work sessions are indexed t = 1, ..., TK and measurement periods j = 1,
..., T.  Thus j = 1 denotes an aggregate of sessions t = 1, ..., K; j = 2 denotes an aggregate of sessions
t = K+1, ..., 2K, etc.  As an example, if the potential work session were a month and adult life span
equal to 50 years, then K = 12 and T = 50 would model the Census' Bureau's annual measures of
labor supply.
A person is said to be “employed” during measurement period j if positive hours are worked
during any of the sessions t = (j-1)K+1, ..., jK.  Since n ￿ {0,￿ n/K} for t = 1, ..., T, an individual's t
measured labor supply must be from the set {0, ￿ n/K, 2￿ n/K, 3￿ n/K, ..., ￿ n}.   Assuming that the wage
13
rate Qw, the degree of indivisibility ￿ n/K, and the geometric average marginal disutility of work g tt                          t
are constant throughout the measurement period, then the fraction of people “employed” during the
measurement period j is:
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(14)
This time aggregation of (P2)' produces a special case of the divisible model (P1)''.  In
particular, it is the special case with w(N) = 1 and utility function:
with ˆ v(#) a monotone increasing function.  Mulligan (1998a) uses this model to explain life cycle labor
supply, suggesting that, when the measurement period is a year, K = 2 fits the life cycle date best.
He does not offer a test of the restriction (14).
This analysis shows that Mulligan's (1998a) interpretation of the “hours” margin is
substantially different that Ben-Porath's (1973) or Heckman's (1978, 1993).  Ben-Porath and
Heckman insist that the “hours” and “employment” margins are economically very different while
Mulligan suggests that all labor supply decisions are on the extensive margin and that the distinction
between employment and hours is only one of time aggregation.
Cho and Cooley motivate their v($,n) as a reduced form of a time aggregation problem.  In
fact, their model can be thought of as the time aggregation (as described above) of my optimal
bunching model, although they only consider the special case where preferences are homogeneous
within the interval of time being aggregated and where K = ￿.  Of course, their finding of a highly
wage-elastic employment rate (as well as Kydland and Prescott's (1991)) is a consequence of their
homogeneity assumption.
V.D.  Heterogeneous Fatigue Effects
A fourth way of modifying the indivisible model to generate “extensive” and “intensive”
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Proofs available upon request.
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where g ￿ is a time-specific preference parameter common to all agents, the function g(￿ n ) models the t
i
possibility that agents may have systematically different preferences according to their degree of
indivisibility, J  is an agent and time specific preference parameter which is distribution according to t
i
the function F, and v(n) reflects variation in the disutility of work with the amount worked (v'>0,
v''>0).
Let the date zero “tastes insurance” also insure heterogeneity in the “fatigue effect” parameter
￿ n, so the marginal utility of wealth ￿ is the same for all agents.  Agent i works at date t if and only
if:
where Aw (￿ n) is agent i's date t hourly earnings. t
i
Aggregating across agents, we can compute total hours N, the employment rate $, and hours t       t
for those employed n.  As in the divisible model (P1)'', $ and n are time-invariant functions of N. t                t   t          t
In fact, for any parameterization of (P1)'', there exists distributions of tastes (F and ￿) and a wage
function w(￿ n) such that the model of heterogeneous fatigue effects generates the same macro data
{$,n,w}.  Similarly, for any distributions of tastes (F and ￿) and wage function w(￿ n), there exists tt t
a utility function v($,n) and parameters for the problem (P1)'' generating the same macro data
{$,n,w}. tt t
14
VI.  Time-Aggregated Nonlinear Tax Rules
An important reason for the macro equivalence between the divisible and indivisible models
of labor supply above is the economic insignificance the interval of time measurement.  In fact, the
Census Bureau, Survey Research Center, and others ask workers about their work hours aggregated
over a week, month, or year because those intervals coincide with some of the bunching of economic
activity and, as a consequence, survey respondents can be expected to more accurately rememberNt ￿ F ln
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their activity over those intervals than over some arbitrarily chosen interval.  For example, one reason
that a calendar month or calendar year might be economically significant is because these intervals
coincide with federal government time aggregation rules for computing taxes and transfers.
For simplicity, I assume that the government accounting period (a “year”) is equal to the
interval between work sessions, 1.  Period t labor income taxes are a function -(e) of accounting tt
period earnings e and, for simplicity, it is assumed that -'(e) exists for all nonnegative e.  When the t              tt          t
indivisible model (P2)' is modified to include these tax rules and aggregated according to (A4) and
(A6), aggregate hours for year t are described by equation (14):
where ATR is the year t average tax rate. t
When the divisible model (P1)' is modified to include these tax rules and the marginal disutility
of work function is defined as in Proposition 3, aggregate hours for year t are described by equation
(15):
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where MTR is the year t marginal tax rate. t
Thus average tax rates determine labor supply in the indivisible model while marginal tax
rates determine labor supply (or at least its allocation over time) in the divisible model.  EquationsFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor - 34
(14) and (15) are interesting not only because they expose a difference between the divisible and
indivisible models, but are of significant relevance for public finance.  First, it has been extensively
argued (eg., Hall and Rabushka 1995) that a revenue neutral flat tax would dramatically increase the
efficiency of taxpayers' time allocations.  But, of course, this analysis relies heavily on the
presumption that - holding constant tax revenue - labor supply depends on the marginal tax rate.  My
analysis shows that only the average tax rate matters in a model of indivisible labor when the
“indivisibility” is at least as long as the tax accounting period.  Second, the distinction between
average and marginal taxes rates matters for the estimation of labor supply elasticities (which are used
for, among other things, tax reform simulations).  As shown above for the indivisible model, the
observations of MaCurdy (1992) and others that micro or macro labor supply is unresponsive to
marginal tax rates is quite consistent with large aggregate labor supply elasticities.  Mulligan (1998a)
studies two applications of this result, arguing that average tax rates - and thereby the indivisible labor
model - fit his data better.
Another difference between the divisible and indivisible labor models is that, in a population
of  heterogeneous individuals facing the same labor income tax schedule, the former predicts that the
distribution of a year t sessions earnings has mass points at any “kink” in the tax schedule.  This is not
true in the indivisible labor model where the distribution of nonzero earnings follows the distribution
of w￿ n unless the degree of indivisibility ￿ n itself responds to tax incentives.  This distribution will not tt
typically have mass point unless the underling distributions of tastes or pretax wages have a mass
point.  Thus the findings of Hausman (1986) and others that the income distribution does not seem
to be concentrated at kinks in the individual income tax schedule is consistent with large wage
elasticities of labor supply.
Results are more complicated when the tax accounting period is different from the interval
between work sessions or the function -'(e) is discontinuous, but it is still true that the indivisible tt
labor model has implications that are distinct from the divisible model.
VII.  Conclusions
I build a micro model of the bunching of work and leisure in time.  The optimal length of the
work session is determined by a tradeoff between session fixed costs and stock effects on productivity
or utility.  Higher productivity sessions are worked longer and all sessions worked are worked forFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor - 35
Defining the “reservation wage” to be the lowest wage at which the constraint % ￿ 0
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t
does not bind, Rogerson's example has a degenerate distribution of reservation wages at zero.
at least some minimum length of time.  The minimum depends on the magnitude of the fixed cost, the
form of the stock effects, and the intrasession discount rate, but not worker wealth, wages, or tastes.
For a particular form of the stock effects, all sessions are worked the same length of time and
optimal labor supply can be described in reduced form by the “indivisible labor” models Diamond and
Mirrlees (1978, 1986), Hansen (1985), Hamilton (1988), Rogerson (1988), Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) and many others.  When aggregated across individuals (and perhaps over time),
the indivisible model is equivalent to the divisible model of Lucas and Rapping (1969) defined over
aggregated measures.
Thus, I argue that labor indivisibility (as modeled by these authors) per se has no implications
for macroeconomics.  Although such an aggregation result may not be particularly surprising - for
example, Marshall suggests this in his Principles of Economics (1920/1990) and Hamermesh (1990)
derives a smooth labor demand function in a micro model of lumpy adjustment costs - I am able to
be precise about the mapping between the heterogeneity and the smoothness of well known models
of aggregate behavior.  My proofs also show how Hansen's (1985) and Rogerson's (1988) findings
of an infinite equilibrium aggregate labor supply elasticity are not a consequence of indivisibility, but
of (a) the homogeneity of micro-level decisions, and (b) their definition of equilibrium.  My
Propositions contradict Rogerson's (1988, pp. 3, 14) claims that indivisibility implies large aggregate
labor supply elasticities even when agents are heterogeneous in terms of their reservation wages.  Nor
is it true that substitution along the “extensive” margin must be greater than substitution along the
“intensive” margin.  Rogerson (1988, p. 14) defends his claims with a parametric example, but my
Propositions 2 and 4 show the importance of his assuming a particular distribution for the
“reservation wage.”   Indeed, any nonnegative aggregate labor supply elasticity can be generated by
16
either a divisible or an indivisible model.
I introduce two other models of indivisible labor that do have macro implications.  The first
is a model of the optimal bunching of work over time in which the length of a work session optimally
varies over time and across agents.  Because of the fixed costs and fatigue effects that determine the
optimal bunching, the model places a restriction on the comovements of employment rates, aggregate
hours, and aggregate earnings that are not obtained from a divisible representative agent model ofFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor - 36
Heterogeneous marginal disutility need not imply heterogeneous reservation wages (eg.,
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Rogerson 1988, p. 14).
employment and hours.  In particular, average hourly earnings endogenously vary over time and in
a way that is related to the comovements of employment and hours.  However, this restriction is
rather subtle and, to my knowledge, has not to date been the subject of empirical testing.  It cannot
be shown that, as a consequence of the endogeneity of average hourly earnings, whether the elasticity
of aggregate labor supply with respect to average hourly earnings is necessarily larger (or necessarily
smaller) in the indivisible than in the divisible model.
The second model time-aggregates individual-level choices on the “extensive” margin to
obtain individual-level measures of “employment” and “hours.”  The model restricts the comovements
of employment rates and aggregate hours, but again this restriction is rather subtle and not the subject
of empirical testing to date.
Related, but different, aggregation results can be found in the production theory literature.
For example, Hamermesh (1990) studies a model of discrete micro-level labor demand adjustments
which look smooth at the aggregate level.  Houthakker's (1955) proof - that the input demands of
heterogeneous Leontief firms can aggregate to a smooth industry demand - is a closer and more well-
known analytical cousin to my result.  Houthakker's “fixed proportion” is analogous to my labor
indivisibility ￿ n while each of his firm's profit is analogous to my reservation wage.  Houtkakker
generates Cobb-Douglas input demand by aggregating across firms with identical profits (namely
zero) and fixed proportions distributed Pareto. I generate (in a special case) Cobb-Douglas labor
supply by aggregating across consumers with identical “fixed proportions” (￿ n) and reservation wages
distributed exponential.
Smooth aggregate labor supply is generated from a smooth cross-sectional distribution of
reservation wages, where the reservation wage is the wage at which a worker demands a lottery with
employment probability zero.  I obtain from a smooth distribution of the marginal disutility of work,
but there are other ways to generate a smooth distribution of reservation wages and hence smooth
aggregate labor supply.   This might be achieved with heterogeneity in initial assets, heterogeneity
17
in the lifetime history of various shocks, a staggering of time intervals across agents (eg., agent i's
“period” begins when agent j's “period” is half completed), or heterogeneity in remaining life
expectancy.  Mulligan (1998a)  also shows that approximately smooth individual-level responses canFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor - 37
I emphasize the benefits of aggregation of micro-level discontinuities.  See Grunfeld and
18
Griliches (1960) for examples of potential benefits of aggregating micro-level specification errors.
See Heckman (1993) for a clear statement of this claim and a survey of the literature.
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be derived when reservation wages vary over time and “labor supply” is measured as a time
aggregate.
I refer to “macro data” in both the divisible and indivisible economies as an aggregation of
prices and quantities across individuals with identical initial wealth a, rates of time preference ’,
wages and interest factor profiles {w,Q}, and marginal disutility of wealth schedules U'(C).  My tt
assumption of homogeneity in these dimensions is only for analytical simplicity.  If agents differed,
say, in initial wealth a, and the distributions were the same in the divisible and indivisible economies,
then both the indivisible and divisible economies would generate the same macro data.  This can be
proved by first aggregating within groups of individuals with the same a, applying the relevant
Propositions 1-4, and then aggregating across groups.  What is no longer necessarily true in this case
is that (twice) aggregated prices and quantities appear as if they were generated by a representative
agent.  But this paper does not claim a representative agent always exists, only that indivisible and
divisible economies are indistinguishable with macro data.  Moreover, while the nonexistence of a
representative agent may introduce its own econometric problems (problems which are the basis of
criticisms of aggregate studies by Smith (1977, p. 249) and Pencavel (1986, p 34)), aggregation can
eliminate some econometric problems.
18
Labor productivity cannot be directly observed when a person is not working.  Moreover, a
sample of workers is certainly a sample selected according to labor productivity.  This paper does not
deny these realities.  However, a number of authors in the literature have taken this fact a step further,
suggesting that studies of the “hours” margin are immune to (or at least less sensitive to) this form
of sample selectivity bias than are studies of the “employment” margin.   Their suggestions may be
19
true, but cannot be derived as a matter of logic.  Just as we do not know the current labor
productivity of a woman who has been out of the labor force for five years, we do not know the
summer labor productivity of a school teacher or the late-night labor productivity of a banker who
is continuously employed during normal business hours.  Since the important econometric problem
of inferring labor productivity for those times when a person does not work need not be related toFoundations and Implications of Indivisible Labor - 38
the divisibility of labor or to the distinction between “employment” and “hours,” I have neglected any
discussion of that issue in my analysis of indivisibility.
Time aggregation can be of economic significance, for example, when it is a part of
government tax policy.  Indivisible labor therefore has important implications for public finance.
Given that measures of economic activity are typically aggregated over periods no longer than
a year, I am primarily interested in fairly high frequency bunching of work and leisure.  But I suspect
that similar economic issues arise at lower frequencies, perhaps with retirement and long-term
employment or with life cycle job and occupation changes.  In these cases, the “fixed cost” f might
represent time accumulating firm-specific human capital and the “work session” tenure with a firm.
or f might represent time accumulating occupation-specific human capital and the “work session”
tenure in that occupation or industry.  An interesting extension of my analysis would be to
simultaneously introduce fixed costs which are amortized over different horizons and fatigue effects
which decay at different rates.
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